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The significance of standards in international agricultural trade is continuously rising. Due to 
their complexity, especially private industry standards are often expected to have a negative 
impact on agricultural export sectors in developing countries. The successful adoption of 
standards by a broad number of producers can be seen as a condition to limit negative socio-
economic consequences.  
This case study for the mango export sector in Piura, Peru, analyzes the adoption of the 
Eurepgap standard, based on a theoretical framework of a compliance process of three stages 
(information stage, decision stage, implementation stage). The empirical part is based on 
interviews with farmers. A comparison between certified producers and a control group 
identifies the mechanisms that lead to an adoption of the standard.  
A first major barrier to adoption is the access to information on the standard. Exporting 
enterprises are the most important source of information. Analysis at the decision stage shows 
that vertical integration is the most important factor in the adoption of the standard. A 
contemplation of the implementation stage shows that the costs of compliance are at 9.51 
US$/ton on average or 3.8% of the product price. Factors that influence the costs of 
compliance are the starting point, the target level and the involvement of exporter enterprises.  
Consequently, the activities of exporter enterprises can be identified as the key factor for the 
adoption of the standard in the sector. Furthermore, the standard involves the risk of exclusion 
of certain producer groups.   
1 Introduction 
In recent decades, an ongoing liberalization of international agricultural trade can be 
observed, which also should provide better export opportunities for developing countries. 




significant in international agricultural trade (Wilson and Otsuki, 2003) and may counteract 
the liberalization of agricultural markets. 
The question of whether a standard acts as a barrier to trade or not can have severe 
implications for a developing country's agricultural sector and economy. There is a concern 
that standards can negatively affect the competitiveness of developing countries and impede 
actors from these countries from entering high-value food markets (World Bank, 2005 p. ix). 
This is especially important from a development point of view, as a non-discriminative 
participation in trade, especially by vulnerable and marginalized groups is often seen as a 
means to alleviate poverty and improve food security (McCulloch et al., 2001 p. 11). 
This paper presents a case study which provides empirical evidence about the adoption of the 
Eurepgap standard in the mango export sector in Piura, Peru. Mango production in Peru is 
highly oriented toward the exportation of mango, mainly to North American and European 
markets. In 2002, mangoes accounted for more than 5% of Peruvian agricultural exports. In 
recent years, various standards which apply to Peruvian exports of fresh mangos were 
gradually introduced and continue to be strengthened. The private industry’s Eurepgap 
standard is the most important among these standards and involves the highest cost of 
compliance for producers. The Piura region, in the North of the country, has a diverse group 
of mango farmers, offering the opportunity to observe the potential impacts of the Eurepgap 
standard on various types of producers. 
Following a theoretical model of the compliance process based on the concept of the diffusion 
of innovations by Rogers (1995), this paper analyzes the adoption process with the Eurepgap 
standard by Piuran mango producers. Based on data from farm interviews in Piura, the 
mechanisms that lead to and factors that influence the adoption of standards are identified and 




determined. Finally, the paper presents an assessment of the possible impact of the standard 
on the Piuran mango export sector. 
2 Methodology 
2.1  Conceptual framework 
A theoretical base for the compliance process of a standard is provided by Rogers (1995) who 
developed an explanation model for the diffusion of innovations. According to Chemnitz 
(forthcoming), the adoption of a quality and safety standard can be considered as the adoption 
of an innovation and hence can be analyzed following the concept for the diffusion of 
innovations. For this research, a slight modification of the concept for the diffusion of 
innovations was used as the conceptual framework.  
Accordingly, the process of compliance with a standard is described as a process which 
consists of three stages: 1) information, 2) decision and 3) implementation (see Figure 1).  
At the first stage the producer obtains information on the standard. He or she becomes aware 
of the existence of the standard and gains knowledge on how the standard works. The 
information stage is essential to pass to the subsequent steps of the compliance process, as 
certain knowledge of the standard is necessary to make a decision.  
At the second stage the producer makes a decision on the implementation of the standard. 
Once the decision to implement the standard is made, the producer enters the implementation 
stage. The implementation stage consists of the introduction of the standard on the farm. At 
the end of this compliance process, a producer should comply with the standard and the 
standard can be considered as adopted. 
At each of the stages a dependent variable and influencing factors are assumed. At the 
information stage, the dependent variable is the quality of information a producer has and by 




information a producer has on standards is influenced by a number of variables such as 
financial resources and cosmopolitanism which are listed in detail in Table 1. 
Figure 1: Conceptual framework of the compliance process  
Source: Own figure based on Rogers (1995). 
At the decision stage the dependent variable is the actual decision a producer has taken toward 
an implementation. It is assumed that the decision is influenced by a set of socio-economic 
characteristics such as farm characteristics and education which are listen in detail in Table 2. 
Once the decision to implement the standard is made, the producer enters the implementation 
stage of the compliance process. At this stage, the paper presents the costs of compliance, 
generated by the standard on the farm level, and gives an overview on the perceived problems 
and benefits of the implementation of the standard, which can be included in a broader 
concept of costs of compliance and constitute a first step toward a cost-benefit analysis. 
The costs of compliance are disaggregated into two elements: recurrent costs and non-
recurrent costs. To calculate the annual costs of compliance, the non-recurrent costs are 
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depreciated annually and added to the recurrent costs on an annual basis. In order to keep the 
results comparable among farms, the costs of compliance were calculated on a per ha and a 
per output unit basis. 
To analyze possible determinants of the costs of compliance, the factors listed in Table 3 such 
as farm size and the type of certification were tested for correlations with the level of the costs 
of compliance. 
2.2  Research area 
The data collection of the research was carried out in San Lorenzo in Piura, Peru. In San 
Lorenzo, of a total area of 57,500 ha about 12,000 ha are cultivated with mango (Portal Peru 
Rural Piura, 2005) which shows the high importance of mango export production in the 
region. The sector has a highly diverse structure in terms of farm size, farm type and socio-
economic characteristics (Fort et al., 2001 pp. 27 ff.). 
2.3  Research design and data collection 
The sample for the interviews which were conducted in 2004/05 was selected out of the total 
population of producers registered by the National Agrarian Health Service (SENASA) as 
being producers of mangoes for exportation. Out of a population of 2,451 producers 
producing mango for exportation in general and a group of 80 Eurepgap certified producers a 
stratified sample was taken. The first stratum consists of producers with Eurepgap, the second 
contains producers without Eurepgap. For the first stratum, 28 producers were selected out of 
the Eurepgap group applying a snowball system. For the second stratum, 33 producers were 
selected out of the registry of SENASA by simple random selection.  
The stratification of the sample by the outcome variable “compliance with Eurepgap” leads to 
an ex-post facto research design. The design allows the comparison of the group of producers 
complying with Eurepgap to a reference group which is representative for the mango export 




2.4  Data analysis 
For the analysis of the results at the information stage, qualitative analysis is used to evaluate 
the quality of information producers have on the standard. To describe the distribution of 
information among the producers, descriptive statistics are applied. The analysis of factors 
that may have an influence on information access is performed using t-test and Chi²-test.  
At the decision stage, qualitative analysis for the analysis of reasons for and against 
certification is combined with t-tests and Chi²-tests to analyze possible influencing factors.  
The monetary costs of compliance are calculated for each farm and presented as annual costs 
per ha and annual costs per ton. The costs of compliance per output unit are calculated based 
on the average yield in Piura from 1997 to 2002.  
Factors that possibly influence the costs of compliance are analyzed applying t-test and 
correlation analysis. To determine perceived problems and perceived benefits of applying the 
standard, qualitative analysis is applied.  
3 Results 
3.1  The information stage 
The main result at the information stage is the distribution of information within the sector. In 
order to describe the diffusion of information, two quality categories of information are 
created. The first category, "sufficient knowledge", contains producers that can be expected to 
have enough knowledge to start with an implementation. The second group, "insufficient 
knowledge", consists of the remaining producers. 
The analysis of the distribution of information within the sector reveals a large information 
gap. Out of 61 producers, 33 have sufficient and 28 insufficient knowledge. The comparison 
of the two groups shows that there are clear differences between the producers with respect to 




Table 1: Test results for variables explaining “sufficient knowledge of the standard” 
Explaining variable  Test variable  Significance level of χ²- or t-test 
Member of producer organization  +++  Networks 
Vertical integration: contract 
farming or higher  
+++ 
Journeys to Piura > once a week   +++ 
Journeys to Lima > once a month   0 
Cosmopolitanism 
Residence not on farm  +++ 
Telephone > once a week  +++  Media access  
Internet > once a week   +++ 
Education   Level of educational attainment of 
the farm head 
Higher in case of sufficient 
knowledge, but not statistically tested 
Farm size   +++  Farm characteristics  
Commercial orientation of the farm   Higher in case of sufficient 
knowledge, but not statistically tested 
Financial resources  Total amount of revenues   ++ 
+: p ≤ 0.10; ++: p ≤ 0.05; +++: p ≤ 0.01; 0 = not significant.  
Results indicate a possible influence of these factors on the access to information and suggest 
that the problems in accessing information can be traced back to limitations caused by socio-
economic constraints.  
But despite of the observed differences, among those producers with sufficient information 
also such can be found who are not members of producer organizations, less cosmopolite, 
without access to telephone or internet and with a lower educational attainment, own small, 
semi-commercial family farms and dispose of little financial resources. The only 
unambiguous variable is vertical integration. Producers with sufficient information in no case 
have a vertical integration lower than contract farming, i.e. none of them sells to an 
intermediate.  
This observation goes in line with the findings from the analysis of the information channels. 
22 out of the 33 producers with sufficient knowledge declared to be provided with 
information on the standard by an exporter enterprise. 
Consequently, one can conclude that the access to information states a first major barrier to 




compliance process through a lack of the necessary knowledge. It is also shown that typically 
poorer and smaller producers are disadvantaged in accessing information. Nevertheless, most 
shortcomings that originate from socio-economic constraints can be overcome by the 
activities of exporter enterprises. Thus, vertical integration can be seen as the most important 
influencing factor for the access to information. 
3.2  The decision stage 
The research at the decision stage consists of an analysis of the reasons in favor and against 
certification with the standard and a comparison of the producers with respect to the socio-
economic characteristics that ex-ante have been considered to influence the decision. For the 
analysis a subset of 46 cases is used, excluding those who could not give reasons for their 
decision due to a lack of information. Out of this sample, 28 producers have decided in favor 
and 18 producers against implementation. 
The analysis of the decision making shows that a proactive approaching of producers to the 
standard rarely occurs. The idea of an implementation is rather brought to producers by the 
exporter enterprises and the decision is mostly made at the instance of these enterprises. 
Correspondingly, most producers said that the standard was implemented because it was 
either required by the buyer or, more generally, by international markets. Out of the 46 
producers, all in all 30 mentioned one or both of these reasons. Other reasons in favor of 
implementation, such as the opportunity for farm improvement or a possible commercial 
advantage through the standard play a minor role. Decisions against implementation in five 
cases were explained by the lack of financial resources. Also five producers mentioned they 
would implement the standard as soon as it would be obligatory. Other reasons were given all 
in all four times. 
Similarly to the information stage, the analysis of possible influencing factors shows clear 




Table 2: Test results for variables explaining decision “in favor of certification” 
Explaining 
variable 
Test variable  Significance level of χ²- or t-test 
Member of producer organization  ++  Networks 
Vertical integration: contract 
farming or higher  
++ 
Journeys to Piura > once a week   ++ 
Journeys to Lima > once a month   0 
Cosmopolitanism 
Residence not on farm  ++ 
Total farm size   +++ 
Mango area   +++ 
Commercial orientation of the farm  Higher in case of decision in favor, but 
not statistically tested 
Farm 
characteristics 
Number of cultivars   0 
Total amount of revenues   ++ 
Credit use   + 
Financial 
resources 
Amount of credits   0 
Education   Level of educational attainment of 
the farm head  
Higher in case of decision in favor, but 
not statistically tested 
Age   Age  +++ 
  +: p ≤ 0.10; ++: p ≤ 0.05; +++: p ≤ 0.01; 0 = not significant. 
But as already observed at the information stage, the only variable that appears to be 
necessary for a favorable decision is the vertical integration. Among the producers who 
decided positively, no producer can be found with a vertical integration lower than contract 
farming.  
The results at the decision stage again point to a key role of the exporter enterprises in the 
adoption process. First, a favorable decision is mostly explained by the requirement of the 
buyer. Second, the vertical integration offsets the effect of other possible influencing 
variables. 
3.3  The implementation stage 
At the implementation stage, the costs of compliance are measured, influencing factors are 
determined and producers' perceptions of problems and benefits the standard brings about for 




























Source: Own calculations. 
As Figure 2 shows, the costs of compliance range between 10 and 580 US$/ha/year, 
accounting for 145 US$/ha/year on average. Calculated on a per ton base, the costs account 
for 9.51 US$/ton/year and range from 0.65 US$/to and 38.08 US$/ton. In relation to the farm 
gate price, the costs of compliance add up to 3.8% in the mean, ranging from 0.3% and 
15.2%. That means that the costs of compliance can, at least in single cases, result in a 
considerable economic burden.  
A striking point is the large variability of the costs of compliance. With the large range and a 
correspondingly high standard deviation of 127 US$/ha/year the data raises the question of 
factors that influence the amount of the costs of compliance. Contrary to the previous 
assumptions, no significant relation between the expected influencing factors and the costs of 








Table 3: Test results for variables explaining the level of the costs of compliance  
Explaining 
variable 
Test variable  Significance level of t-test 
or correlation analysis 
Member of producer organization  0  Networks 
Vertical integration: contract farming or higher   Not tested 
Type of certification   Individual or group certification   0 
Total farm size   0  Farm characteristics 
Commercial orientation of the farm   0 
Financial resources  Total amount of revenues   0 
  +: p ≤ 0.10; ++: p ≤ 0.05; +++: p ≤ 0.01; 0 = not significant. 
Alternatively, three other explanations for the variability of the costs of compliance can be 
specified. First, the costs are influenced by the starting point, i.e. the difference between the 
technical level of the farm before implementation and the technical level required by the 
standard. Second, the target level, which is the technical level the producer aspires to with the 
implementation, influences the costs of compliance level. The target level largely depends on 
individual factors, like for example the personal conviction of the farm head about the 
standard. Third, exporter enterprises again play an important role, as the enterprises often 
support producers in the implementation of the standard and by that overtake some costs, thus 
allowing the producers to externalize certain cost items and lower the farm's costs of 
compliance.  
The assessment of perceived problems and benefits shows that the most common problem 
caused by the standard are the elevated costs. Other problems are of a minor importance and 
involve difficulties related to the practical adaptation of the farm to the standard and problems 
in understanding the regulations. The perceived benefits are more manifold. Producers 
reported an increase of productivity, better marketing conditions, an elevation of knowledge 
of workers and farm owners and improved working conditions. Furthermore, higher product 
quality, better farm hygiene, improved relations to other producers and an improved 




positive cost-benefit ratio, i.e. in most cases the elevated costs and some inconveniences with 
the implementation were paid off by the benefits provided by the standard.  
4 Conclusion 
This analysis of the compliance process allows drawing a number of conclusions on the 
adoption of the standard and its diffusion as well as on its possible impact on the sector.  
A first important result is the observation that the first impediment for the adoption of the 
standard is the access of information by the producers. The majority of the producers are not 
even able to do the first step toward compliance as they do not obtain the necessary 
information.  
The second important finding is the important role of the exporter enterprises for the adoption 
of the standard by the producers. Despite of clear differences between the producers with 
respect to a number of socio-economic characteristics which point to a possible influence of 
these factors on the adoption, the role of the exporter enterprises appears to surmount their 
significance. By providing the necessary information to producers, influencing the decision 
making and supporting the producers in the implementation, the exporter enterprises turn into 
the key factor for the adoption of the standard and its diffusion.  
This strong role of the exporter enterprises has to be assessed ambiguously. On the one hand, 
the enterprises support poorer and smaller producers which otherwise would not be able to 
comply with the standard to obtain a certification and run the risk of being excluded from the 
lucrative European markets. On the other hand, the standard can lead to an increased 
dependency of producers on the enterprises. First, exporter enterprises in many cases are the 
holder of the certificate. By that they gain a monopsony position for exports to markets 
requiring the standard which involves the risk of the payment of prices below the competitive 




enterprises into the farm management which can result in a loss of independence of 
producers. 
In general, the little initiative of producers toward an adoption and the lack of actors other 
than the exporter enterprises that support the diffusion of the standard involves the risk of the 
exclusion of those producers from the Eurepgap markets which are not considered by the 
enterprises to be worthwhile to obtain a certification.  
A striking observation is the heterogeneity of the costs of compliance observed among farms 
and the insignificance of the ex ante determinants tested. This poses a challenge for future 
investigation into the determinants as well as for refinement of the method for data collection 
on costs of compliance.  
A final conclusion can be drawn regarding the standard's impacts on the development of the 
sector. With respect to the observation that the standard on the one hand helps certified 
producers to raise their productivity and by that their competitiveness and on the other hand 
entails the risk of exclusion of certain producer groups it can be expected that the standard 
leads to a consolidation of the value chains. These consolidated value chains are likely to 
include the more competitive producers but may exclude other producers. As the producers in 
risk of exclusion were typically already in advance the more disadvantaged, this can imply 
negative effects on income distribution in the region, resulting in adverse poverty impacts.  
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